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Abstract
This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking
risk for each country in the euro area. To this end, we use an indicator of banking sector risk
in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis literature, and 10-year government
yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a dynamic approach
to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in each country, allowing
us to check for episodes of significant and abrupt increase in short-run causal linkages. The
empirical results indicate that episodes of causality intensification vary considerably in both
directions over time and across the different EMU countries. The directionality suggests the
presence of causality intensification, mainly from banks to sovereigns in crisis periods.
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1. Introduction
Today, six years since the outbreak of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 - when the newly elected Greek government an-
nounced that the country’s budget deficit was much larger than previously reported - we
can see that its origin goes deeper than the fiscal imbalances in euro countries. The inter-
connection between private and public debt, and thus between banking and sovereign crises,
is obvious. However, whether it was private debt that ultimately bankrupted sovereigns, or
whether, conversely, it was excessive public debt that undermined the banking sector is a
question that is not easily answered.
An extensive review of the channels through which sovereign risk can affect bank risk
(and vice versa) suggest that the drivers of this relationship can be divided into two broad
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +34 934020113; Fax: +34 934039082.
Preprint submitted to Journal of International Money and Finance December 22, 2015
categories:1 (i) Those who work via the assets side of banks’ balance sheets; and (ii) Ones
who work through the liability side. According to the former category: (i) A deteriora-
tion/improvement in a government’s creditworthiness, as perceived by the markets, may
cause losses/gains on banks’ portfolios of sovereign securities and may also affect banks’
standing in relation to their loans to the government; and (ii) Since government bonds are
typically used as collateral, e.g. in repos, a fall in their price can trigger margin calls or larger
haircuts, thus reducing the liquidity that can be obtained via a given nominal amount of
sovereign paper. Regarding the latter category (sovereign-bank dependence via mechanisms
that work on banks’ liabilities side) (i) Governments explicitly/implicitly guarantee schemes
on bank bonds during crisis periods whose effects are strongly linked with the creditworthi-
ness of the sovereign; (ii) Sovereign rating usually put a ceiling on bank rating and sovereign
downgrade often leads to downgrade of domestic banks; and (iii) Changes in sovereign yields
tend to affect the availability and cost of bank funding.
On the reverse, a banking crisis can also trigger a surge in sovereign risk. The impact
on the public finances typically comes from the recession and the fiscal expansion typically
implemented to deal with it. A comprehensive analysis of the transmission channels of
financial instability (or crisis) on a country’s fiscal stance is presented by Eschenbach and
Schuknecht (2002). These authors identify three major transmission channels of financial
instability on a country’s fiscal stance, namely (i) Direct bailout costs; (ii) Direct revenue
effects; and (iii) Indirect effect via the impact on the real economy. Direct bailout costs
focuses on the direct government support provided to distressed financial institutions in order
to avoid a systemic financial crisis. The impact depends strongly on the form of government
interventions. The revenue effect impacts through the downward changes in asset prices
driven by financial instability causing reduction in tax paid (household on wealth, corporate
and sales taxes etc.). A reduction in real estate transactions (price and volume), slowdown
in equity market and decrease in dividends also negatively impacts the fiscal revenue. The
indirect effect works through the real economy where lower wages and higher unemployment
triggers a reduction in personal income tax and social contributions while simultaneously
increasing the unemployment payments. Subsequent increase in government debt and higher
interest payments both exacerbates the effect.
Based on these linkages, some authors (Brunnermeier et al. (2011) and Reichlin (2013),
among them) have described the development of a ‘diabolic loop’ as the major cause of
the crisis in EMU countries. European banks, encouraged by the absence of any regulatory
discrimination between bonds, held an excessive part of the national debt, which - far from
being safe - fed never-ending speculation on the banks’ solvency. In turn, sovereigns were
in constant danger of having to rescue their banks, which, combined with the uncertainty
regarding the kind of fiscal support they would receive from their European partners, in-
creased the riskiness of their bonds. However, banks’ exposure to the domestic sovereign
debt had declined steadily for all EMU countries between the mid-1990s till the end of 2008
(see Figure 4(a) in Angelini et al. (2014)). In most EMU countries, end 2008 marks an
inversion in this trend, where the banks began to increase their domestic sovereign debt
1For a recent survey, see Angelini et al. (2014).
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holdings. This suggests that the increasing exposure was a consequence not the cause of
the crisis although it may have contributed to exacerbating the crisis by intensifying the
bank-sovereign nexus. As most of these authors2 try to establish or assume the existence
of a diabolic loop between bank and sovereign risk, to our knowledge there is a lack of em-
pirical support to identify, trace and quantify the asymmetrical directional intensity of risk
transfer. This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature where direction and intensity of
risk transfer between banking and sovereign risk is being evaluated for individual countries
for each quarter between 2005Q1-2013Q2.
In a parallel development, some authors (see, e.g. Shambaugh (2012)) have pointed out
that the euro area is currently facing three interlocking crises (banking, sovereign debt, and
economic growth) which together challenged the viability of the currency union. According
to this line of thought, these crises connected with one another in several ways: the problems
of weak banks and high sovereign debt were mutually reinforcing, and both were exacerbated
by weak, constrained growth. An analysis of the interrelationship between debt and growth
- an unresolved issue of great importance, on which there is no consensus in the literature
(see Krugman (2011), Delong and Summers (2012), Cochrane (2011) or Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010), to name just a few) - is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we will focus on the
interconnection between banking and sovereign risks in EMU countries.
While there is a substantial amount of empirical literature exploring the determinants
of either bank risk or sovereign risk in isolation, few papers to date have tried to empir-
ically quantify the interdependence or even contagion between the sovereign and banking
sectors. Exceptions are Alter and Schu¨ler (2012), Gross and Kok (2013) and Alter and
Beyer (2014), who applied different extensions of vector autoregressive (VAR) models; and
De Bruyckere et al. (2013) who investigated the presence of contagion by computing excess
correlation (over and above what one would expect from fundamental factors). However,
though they use different methodologies, all these papers apply the same measure of bank-
ing and sovereign risk: credit default swap3 (CDS) spreads on 5-year senior debt contracts,
since these are known to be the most actively traded and therefore the most liquid. In this
context, our paper makes the first major contribution to this branch of the literature by
applying indicators of bank and sovereign risk that differ considerably from the ones used in
previous literature. As far as we know, this is the first paper to use measures other than CDS
2Angelini et al. (2014) point out that once a shock has set in motion a weakening of the sovereign, or of
the banking system, a self-reinforcing feedback loop can easily develop. According to them, there is ample
evidence that tensions in the sovereign debt market affect banks’ funding conditions, and hence lending to
domestic households and firms; a credit squeeze weakens the economy, leading to a decline in borrowers’
creditworthiness and to further tensions in the sovereign’s situation, due to falling fiscal revenues and the
need for further fiscal tightening; finally, supply and demand factors contribute to depress credit growth,
with negative effects on banks’ interest margin and profitability.
3The theoretical use of a CDS contract is to provide insurance against unexpected losses due to a default
by a corporate or sovereign entity. The debt issuer is known as the reference entity, and a default or
restructuring on the predefined debt contract is known as a credit event. In the most general terms, it is a
bilateral deal in which a ‘protection buyer’ pays a periodic fixed premium, usually expressed in basis points
of the reference asset’s nominal value, to a counterpart known by convention as the ‘protection seller’. The
total amount paid per year as a percentage of the notional principal is known as the CDS spread.
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spreads to quantify the directional intensity of risk transfer between banks and sovereigns
in the euro area. Our selection offers three major advantages: (1) It extends the sample
period of analysis incorporating a few pre-crisis years; (2) It allows the inclusion of countries
for which CDS spreads are thinly traded or not available; and (3) It measures the relative
creditworthiness of the banking sector of different countries based on the same parameters.
Our indicator of banking risk in each country is based on the contingent claim analysis
(CCA) framework. Specifically, the average ‘distance-to-default’ (DtD) based on the simple
average DtD of all banks headquartered in a particular country will be the proxy of banking
risk used in the analysis.4 This indicator, which is based on Merton’s model (1974), is
calculated and broadly explained in a companion paper: Singh et al. (2015). On the other
hand, 10-year government yield spreads over Germany will be our measure of sovereign risk,5
since they reflect the premium that investors demand in order to bear the sovereign risk.
A second contribution of this paper is the directional quantification of significant, short-
run abrupt increases in the causal linkages which might be associated with contagion periods
(see Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Constaˆncio (2012)) using dynamic Granger-causality tests
between the selected measures of banking and sovereign risk. As direct quantification of
possible bailout costs and effects are extremely discretionary and heavily disputed, we avoid
taking stand on the causal effect of different bailout strategy. Our econometric methodol-
ogy has several advantages over the alternative approach of focusing on contemporaneous
correlations (corrected or not for volatility). First, while correlation is a symmetrical mea-
sure, Granger-causality is an asymmetrical one, so our procedure provides information on
the direction and magnitude of the risk transmission (from sovereign to banking risk, from
banking to sovereign risk, or both). Second, the lag structure offers valuable insights for
understanding the information flow between the two types of risk. Third, by investigating
dynamic causal linkages through a rolling window, we examine how the strength of the rela-
tionships evolves over time, allowing us to detect episodes of sudden and temporary increases
in these relationships. Fourth, we establish an approximate periodization for causality in-
tensification by looking directly into the data (i.e., without making a priori conjectures on
the time periods during which the risk transmission process might have started to spread).
Additionally, like the VAR approach, our methodology enables us to capture the dynamic
structure of the variables and offers a convenient framework for separating long-run and
short-run components of the data generation process.
Our results suggest that in the pre-crisis period, from early 2005 till the collapse of
4Hoque et al. (2015) also use the distance-to-default as a measure of banking risk. However, the con-
struction of their indicator differs from ours. Concretely, they follow Laeven and Levine (2009) to capture
default risk and their index is estimated as the average ROA plus the capital-to-asset ratio divided by the
standard deviation of the ROA.
5Some authors contend that past CDS spreads improve the forecast quality of bond yield spreads (Pal-
ladini and Portes (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2010)). However, CDS markets (in both the sovereign
and the banking sectors) have been quite illiquid since late 2008, only one year before the onset of the
euro sovereign debt crisis. This is one of the reasons we decided to make use of 10-year yield spreads over
euro-denominated German government bonds instead of CDS (see Section 3.2), even though the 10-year
yield is used in the case of Germany in order to include Germany in our analysis.
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Lehman Brothers, 77% of the total episodes of causality intensification detected were from
sovereigns to banks and coincided with a period of economic stagnation in EMU countries
or with the beginning of a downturn in GDP growth in the euro area. After the last quar-
ter of 2008, coinciding with the beginning of the financial crisis and the implementation of
government measures to support financial institutions, the direction of the causality intensi-
fication underwent a change. In this crisis period the majority of the causality intensification
episodes (around 63% of the total) ran from banks to sovereigns. This finding is noticeable
in the cases of France, Greece, Ireland where episodes of causality intensification are de-
tected only in this direction. For the case of Germany, Portugal and the Netherlands they
account for more than 70% of the episodes. Conversely, in Belgium and Finland causality
intensification was mainly from sovereigns to banks, while in Spain, Italy and Austria there
were similar numbers of episodes of causality intensification in both directions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the linkages between
sovereign and banking risk in EMU countries. Section 3 briefly explains the selection and
creation of our banking and sovereign risk indicators. Section 4 explains our data selection
methodology. The econometric methodology used in our analysis is presented in Section 5.
Section 6 summarizes the main results and, finally, Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Sovereign/bank linkages
The major focus of the sovereign and banking risk literature were the development of
diverse range of risk indicators to understand and measure different dimensions of risk in
isolation. However recently, the rapidly deteriorating outlook in the Eurozone gave rise to
a new strand of literature focusing on the joint dynamics between sovereign and banking
risk. Papers looking on this topic have gained importance during the recent European debt
crisis. Here we will touch upon the major contributions made in this area by Acharya et al.
(2014), Alter and Schu¨ler (2012), Alter and Beyer (2014), Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Gross
and Kok (2013) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011).
Acharya et al. (2014) finds empirical evidence to support the bi-directional negative
feedback loop between banking and sovereign credit risk during the recent crisis. Using CDS
rates on European sovereigns and banks for 2007-11, they show that bailouts triggered the
rise of sovereign credit risk and find evidence for widening sovereign spreads and narrowing
banking spreads after a bailout.
Alter and Schu¨ler (2012) study the relationship between the sovereign CDS of seven
European Union (EU) countries and the CDS of their banks. The authors analyze the
period between June 2007 and May 2010 and look at differences in the market before and
after government interventions. They find that before the government rescue interventions
contagion spills over from the banking sector to the sovereign CDS market, whereas after
the interventions sovereign CDS spreads largely determine the price of banks’ CDS series.
The authors also highlight the short-term impact of the financial sector on sovereign CDS
spreads and its insignificance in the long run.
Alter and Beyer (2014) show that the contagion between banking and sovereign fluctuates
within a stable interval over the period October 2009-July 2012. It is high around important
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policy events in April 2010, August 2011, and June 2012 and its components (banks-to-
sovereigns and sovereigns-to-banks) increase during the period of analysis, which suggests
intensifying feedback loops between euro area banks and sovereigns.
Ejsing and Lemke (2011) examine co-movements between sovereign CDS spreads of ten
Euro area countries and CDS of their banks for the period from January 2008 to June 2009.
The authors find that the government rescue packages led to a decrease in the CDS spreads
of the banking sector at the cost of the increase in the price of sovereign CDSs. Furthermore,
the bailout schemes made sovereign CDSs even more sensitive to any future shocks.
Gross and Kok (2013) illustrate, using a mixed-cross-section Global Vector Autoregres-
sive (MCS-GVAR) model, that: i) Spillover potential in the CDS market was particularly
pronounced in 2008 and more recently in 2011-12; ii) In 2008 contagion primarily went from
banks to sovereigns but the direction reversed in 2011-12 in the course of the sovereign debt
crisis; and iii) The system of banks and sovereigns became more densely connected over time.
Dieckmann and Plank (2011) also find evidence for a private-to-public risk transfer in the
countries with government interventions. Moreover, the authors argue that the magnitude
of this impact depends on the importance of a country’s financial system in the pre-crisis
and this transfer is larger for the EMU countries than non-EMU states.
3. Assessing banking and sovereign risk
3.1. Bank risk indicator
To assess the banking sector risk in each EMU country, we use a standard forward looking
market based measure. Based on contingent claim literature pioneered by Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974), we use ‘distance-to-default (DtD)’ as the bank risk indicator. Its
foundation lies in the isomorphic relationship between equity and call option. Since equity
is a junior claim to debt, it can be modeled as an European call option on the firms’ assets
(A) with exercise price equal to the face value of debt (D).
Calculation methodology: Consider a bank having simple capital structure with N shares
of common stock (market capital E) and all debt denominated as zero coupon bonds (market
value F , maturity T ). Using value conservation equation:
A = E + F (1)
Assuming that the assets returns follow the Generalized Brownian Motion, the Black-
Scholes option pricing formula yields:
E = AN(d1)− e−rTDN(d2) (2)
where,
• N(∗) is the cumulative normal distribution;
• r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality;
• d1 = ln(
A
D
)+(r+0.5σ2A)T
σA
√
T
; and d2 = d1 − σA
√
T .
6
Applying Ito’s Lemma, the asset volatility (σA) can be linked with equity volatility (σE)
as:
σE = N(d1)
A
E
σA (3)
Inverting Eqs. 2 and 3 and numerically solving for A and σA, yields the T periods ahead
DtD as:
DtD =
A−D
σAA
(4)
Once individual banks’ DtD are calculated, following Harada et al. (2010), we consider
the banking sector risk as the simple average of individual DtD (aDtD) of all banks head-
quartered in a particular country. For detailed calculation methodology, see Singh et al.
(2015). DtD can be interpreted as how many standard deviations the asset value of the
bank is away from the debt threshold. The closer it is to zero, the closer the firm is to
distress.
Why DtD over CDS spreads? First, they offer a longer history compared to CDS spreads
(Figure 1). Indeed most of the banking CDS started trading in the latter half of 2005 and
quality data was not available until late 2007 (in most of the cases the data is available
starting December 2007). Also very few of them have remained liquid since the onset of US
financial crisis. Thus, this choice of risk indicator will allow us to examine the interconnection
between the risk in the sovereign and the banking sectors starting 2005 (more than three
years before the onset of the global financial crisis).
Second, it includes more banks in each country (see Table 2) than those for which CDS
data are available (better representativeness) and seem to perform better in crisis monitoring
(see Singh et al. (2015)). To see whether this indicator represents a similar movement as
CDS, we plot aDtD and average CDS6 for each country in our analysis separately (Figure
1). As can be seen, the aDtD at country level mirrors the average CDS movement in all
cases (deterioration in aDtD corresponds to increase in average CDS, and vice versa).
Third, the CDS spreads capture only the credit risk with no established record of correct
pricing. As DtD uses equity price and volatility data (having well established long history)
together with consolidated option pricing methodology, it provides more authenticity. Also
this is relatively free from political interference and allows us to include countries (e.g.,
Finland) for which bank CDS data is not available. Note that CDS spreads are market
based real-time pricing while DtD is calculated on a quarterly basis.7
[Figure 1 about here.]
6We have collected 5-year senior bond CDS spread series for all EMU banks over the period 2005-2014
which are available in Datastream. To save space, the list of banks for which CDS spreads data is available
is not tabulated here but is available from authors upon request. Note that the bank sample for countries
changes over time due to bankruptcy, nationalization, de-/listing or other corporate actions.
7This loss of frequency restricts the dynamic analysis.
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3.2. Sovereign risk indicator
Ten-year sovereign bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund will be the
proxy used in this paper to measure sovereign risk, whilst the 10-year benchmark sovereign
yield will be used in the case of Germany.8 Our sample contains eleven EMU countries,
six central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and five
peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
Why sovereign yield spreads over CDS spreads? Firstly, the CDS spreads capture only
the credit risk while yield spreads include inflation expectations, re-denomination risk, de-
mand/supply for lending conditions as well as default risk. Indeed, Krishnamurthy et al.
(2014) decompose euro-denominated government bond yields into two components that are
common across all countries using the euro (an expectations hypothesis component and a
euro-rate term premium) and three components that are country-specific (default risk, re-
denomination risk and market segmentation). While the solvency risk component of bond
yields is captured by default risk, if bond holders worry that rather than (or in addition to)
default on obligations, the government will choose to exit the euro and redenominate its debt
into a local currency at a depreciated exchange rate, then they will require a redenomination
premium. The last component of the bond yield arises from segmentation and illiquidity
frictions.
Secondly, they better represent the size and liquidity concerns in the government debt
market. CDS contracts that reference sovereign credits are only a small part of the sovereign
debt market ($3 trillion notional sovereign CDS outstanding in end-June 2012, compared
with $50 trillion of government debt outstanding at end-2011: International Monetary Fund
(2013)); and lastly, sovereign bonds are less prone to political interference. During the crisis,
European authorities banned naked/uncovered purchases of sovereign CDS based on EMU
countries (International Monetary Fund (2013)). Thus CDS spreads no longer show us what
investors think about the credit risk. They reflect a mix of default risk expectations and
forecasts of rescue measures. This is yet another instance of Goodhart’s Law - ‘a variable
that becomes a policy target soon loses its reliability as an objective indicator’ (Goodhart
(1975a), Goodhart (1975b)).
4. Data
4.1. Banking risk measure
The sample selection methodology is as follows: First, an exhaustive list of all listed
and delisted monetary financial institutions is selected from Bankscope9 database (as on
8We decided to use the 10-year bund yields as a proxy for the risk-free benchmark; they are considered as
such in many academic studies because German sovereign debt has enjoyed a high credit rating for some time
now and its returns can be seen as a good proxy for risk-free asset returns. For the sake of simplicity, this
convention is maintained in the paper. However, since this decision would mean the omission of Germany
from the analysis, we use the 10-year yield as a proxy of the sovereign risk in the case of Germany. We think
that it is relevant to include Germany in the analysis taking into account that since 2008 this country had
a deteriorated banking system and government measures to support the banking system accounted for 25%
of its GDP at the end of 2008 (see Table 6).
9It provides a comprehensive balance sheet data for financial companies.
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10th February 2014). We obtain a total of 199 banks in western Europe. Secondly, only
banks whose shares were publicly listed and traded between the last quarter of 2004 till
the second quarter of 2013 and are headquartered in EMU countries are selected. Finally,
credit institutions which are pure-play insurance, pension or mortgage banks are removed.
To formalize this decision, we use Datastream as an additional source of information. The
major reason for this exclusion is the difference in liability structure and business model
compared to banks. However it doesn’t mean that they are less risky to the financial system.
This choice also ensures that the selected banks share the same accounting currency.
However, it does not mean that they have a similar exchange rate risk profile, since the
level of foreign currency exposure will depend on their respective asset profiles. The market-
based data include daily observations of risk-free interest rates, daily stock price and total
outstanding share in public. The list of variables and data sources are summarized in Table
1 while Table 2 lists the name of banks considered in the analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
Computation of individual DtD: DtD is not measured directly; it is recovered implicitly
from the balance sheet and market price of firm’s liabilities. For our analysis we compute DtD
at quarterly frequency. In practical terms, this means that the balance sheet information
has to be modified from its original quarterly, half-yearly, or in few cases, yearly frequencies
using cubic spline interpolation. Also the real debt contracts are not all written with a
single terminal date. To overcome this problem, a common procedure used by Moody’s
KMV (Vasicek (1984)) and also employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon (T = 1), but
to weight longer term debt (maturity > 1 year) at only 50% of face value. The debt barrier
(D) will then be equal to the face value of short-term liabilities plus half of the long-term
liabilities. Equity value of the firm (E) is computed as the quarterly average of daily market
capitalization (number of common shares x share prices) while quarterly historical volatility
based on daily log-returns is taken as equity volatility (σE). The individual DtD is then
calibrated using the procedure outlined in Section 3.
4.2. Sovereign risk measure
Ten-year bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund (10-year yields in the case
of Germany), which have been calculated from data drawn from Datastream, will be the
proxy used in this paper to measure sovereign risk for all countries in the sample except for
Germany. The 10-year yield is used in the case of Germany in order to be able to include
this country in our analysis. We use quarterly data from 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2 (i.e., T=35
observations).
4.3. Data anlaysis
Graphs in Figure 2 display the evolution of both sovereign and banking risk in the eleven
countries in our sample during the crisis period: from 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q2. The right axis
corresponds to the banking risk indicator (aDtD) and the left axis to the sovereign risk
indicator (the 10-year sovereign yields spread or the 10-year yield).
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[Figure 2 about here.]
5. Econometric methodology
The term ‘contagion’, generally used in contrast to ‘interdependence’, conveys the idea
that after a shock there may be breaks or anomalies in the international transmission mech-
anism which arguably reflect switches across multiple equilibria, market panics unrelated to
fundamentals, investors’ herding, and the like. Contagion has been defined in many differ-
ent ways in the literature,10 including the transfer of any shock across countries (Edwards
(2000)). Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define it as the
situation in which knowledge of crisis in one country increases the risk of crisis in another
one.
Much of the empirical work on measuring the existence of contagion is based on com-
paring correlation coefficients during a relatively stable period with a crisis or a period
of turbulence (see, e.g., Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005)). In fact,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that ‘contagion is a significant increase in cross-market
co-movements after a shock.’ These authors stress that this notion of contagion excludes
a constant high degree of co-movement that exists in all states of the world since; in that
case, markets would be just interdependent. This definition is sometimes referred to as
‘shift-contagion’ and this very sensible term clarifies that contagion arises from a shift in
cross-market linkages, and also avoids taking a stance on how this shift occurs.11
However, given the lack of consensus on contagion, in this study we adopt an eclectic
approximation and directly investigate changes in the existence and the intensity of causality
between banking and sovereign risk among a sample of eleven euro area countries. To that
end, we follow a dynamic approach in order to assess the evolving nature of the Granger
causal linkages and to detect episodes of significant and transitory increases in the pair-wise
Granger causal relationships. The intuition is that if the causal linkage intensifies during
a period of turmoil relative to a period of tranquility, this intensification could identify
episodes of significant propagation of shocks from one side to the other.
5.1. Testing procedure
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972)
and is widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. As is
well known, Granger causality is not a relationship between ‘causes’ and ‘effects.’ Rather, it
is defined in terms of incremental predictive ability (Hoover (2001)): a variable Y is said to
Granger-cause another variable X if past values of Y help to predict the current level of X
better than past values of X alone, indicating that past values of Y have some informational
content that is not present in past values of X. Therefore, knowledge of the evolution of the
10Go´mez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2015) present a detailed literature review of the different definitions
of financial contagion and the most important strategies used in its empirical analysis.
11See Forbes and Rigobon (2001).
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variable Y reduces the forecast errors of the variable X, suggesting that X does not evolve
independently of Y. This concept is suitable for identifying and monitoring contagion.
Tests of Granger causality typically use the same lags for all variables. This poses a
potential problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length.12 In this paper
we use Hsiao (1981) sequential method to test for causality to determine the optimal lag
structure for each variable, combining Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on)
and the definition of Granger-causality.13 Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias
that arises from under-parameterization of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting from
its over-parameterization, removing the ambiguities of the conventional procedure.
Consider the following models,
Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δiXt−i + t (5)
Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δiXt−i +
n∑
j=1
γjYt−j + t (6)
where Xt and Yt are stationary variables (i.e., they are I(0) variables). The following
steps are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality:
1. Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (5), and compute its FPE with
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m. Choose the order which yields the smallest
FPE, say m,14 and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX(m, 0).
2. Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a manipulated
variable as in (6). Compute again the FPE of (6) by varying the order of lags of Yt
from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote
the corresponding FPE as FPEX(m,n).
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3. Compare FPEX(m, 0) with FPEX(m,n) (i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step 1 with
the smallest FPE in step 2). If FPEX(m,0) > FPEX(m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt.
If FPEX(m,0) < FPEX(m,n), then Xt is an independent process.
4. Repeat steps 1 to 2 for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable.
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary (i.e., they
are I(1) variables) and cointegrated (see Dolado et al. (1990)), it is possible to investigate
the existence of Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using
the following error correction models:
12The general principle is that smaller lag lengths have smaller variance but run a risk of bias, while larger
lags reduce the bias problem but may lead to inefficiency.
13Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical
techniques.
14FPEX(m, 0) is computed using the formula: FPEX(m, 0) =
(T+m+1)SSR
(T−m−1)T where T is the total number
of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (5).
15FPEX(m,n) is computed using the formula: FPEX(m,n) =
(T+m+n+1)SSR
(T−m−n−1)T where T is the total
number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (6).
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∆Xt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
δi∆Xt−i + t (7)
∆Xt = α0 + βZt−1 +
m∑
i=1
δi∆Xt−i +
n∑
j=1
γj∆Yt−j + t (8)
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression (Xt = µ + λYt), known
as the error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I(1) variables, but they are not
cointegrated, then β in (8) is assumed to be equal to zero.
In both cases (i.e., Xt and Yt are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated), we
can use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps 1
to 4), as well as substituting expressions (5) and (6) with equations (7) and (8). Proceeding
in this way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry
and Mizon (1999)).
As explained above, since the presence and intensity of Granger-causality may vary over
time, we adopt a dynamic analysis to detect episodes of a significant, short-run abrupt in-
crease in the causal linkages. To assess the dynamic Granger-causality between sovereign
and banking risk, we carry out rolling regressions using a window of four quarterly observa-
tions.16 In each estimation, we apply the Hsiao (1981)’s sequential procedure outlined above
to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case.
5.2. Application
As a first step, we tested the order of integration of the aDtDs, and the sovereign risk
indicator by means of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and
Chinn (1997)’s suggestion, we confirmed the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)
(KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root.
The results, not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request,
decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the first regressions. They do
not reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in the first differences, but strongly reject it in
levels, in the second differences. So, they suggest that both variables can be treated as first-
difference stationary. As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 20
pair relationships using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest17 the absence
of long-run cointegration between the aDtD and the sovereign risk indicator. Therefore, we
tested for Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term
added (i. e., equations (7) and (8) with β = 0).
To summarize, in Figures 3-4 we plot the evolution over time of the difference between
FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case. Therefore, these graphs provide us with a
view of the dynamic bidirectional influence that exists between sovereign and banking risks
16We also used values of six and eight observations. The results are broadly in line with those obtained
for the 4-quarterly windows and are therefore not presented in the interests of space; they are available from
the authors upon request.
17Again, the results are not presented for reasons of space, but are available from the authors upon request.
12
for each EMU country and constitute our indicator of causality intensification based on
time-varying Granger-causality analysis since it illustrates the changes in the directions and
magnitudes over time. In Figure 3 we present the graphs corresponding to the five peripheral
EMU countries included in the sample (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), whilst
Figure 4 displays the graphs corresponding to the six central EMU countries in our sample
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands).
Note that if the difference is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the
case of, say, the banking to sovereign risk relationship, this indicates the existence of a
significant, transitory increase in the Granger-causality relationship running from country
banking risk towards sovereign risk.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
6. Results
In order to examine the time-varying behavior of causality between the two risks, we fol-
low the Bank for International Settlements (2009) and divide the entire time span (2005:Q1
to 2013:Q218) into eight stages (stages 2 to 7 correspond to BIS19 stages 1 to 6). The first
three stages before the Lehman collapse are considered as pre-crisis periods while the rest
are classified as crisis periods. Table 3 tabulates the episodes of causality intensification
(that are significant at the 1% confidence level during each of the above mentioned stages),
directionality and the involved countries.
[Table 3 about here.]
We also document the episodes of causality intensification between banks and sovereigns
when the analysis is done using the important domestic banks in each individual country
(Table 5). For this purpose, we classified all banks into systemically important bank (SIB)
and other national bank based on the list of global or domestic SIBs prepared by European
Central Bank, BIS and Federal Reserve. Countries for which no SIB exist, we took the
biggest bank in terms of total asset. Table 4 list the banks considered for this analysis.
For the ease of understanding directionality with major market events, Figure 5 and 6
documents the major crisis events for different EMU countries together with major policy
actions coordinated at EU level.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
18Note that our most parsimonious model is specified as an autoregressive model of order one [AR(1)] in
differences and therefore we lose two observations at the beginning of the sample.
19Bank for International Settlements.
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6.1. Pre-crisis stages
The first stage, which ran from 2005:Q1 to 2007:Q2, was the period of relative stability
before the beginning of the global financial crisis. Starting from June 2007, losses from
subprime mortgages began to expose large-scale vulnerabilities in US financial system. The
second stage began in 2007:Q3 and ends in 2008:Q1. This was the first period of the crisis,
characterized by concerns over losses on US subprime mortgage loans which escalated into
widespread financial stress (on 9 August 2007, the turmoil spread to the interbank markets).
The sharp rise in the defaults rates revealed the excessive exuberance in the housing market.
The securitization market froze while the confidence in funding markets was eroded. The
crisis spread rapidly through the worldwide financial market and severe stress were observed
around the globe. In brief, what initially appeared to be a problem affecting only a small
part of the US financial system quickly spread more widely, including European Banks.
The third stage ran from 2008:Q2 to 2008:Q3. During this period, after a short respite
following the takeover of Bear Stearns on 16 March 2008, financial asset prices came under
renewed pressure. The liquidity crisis started turning into a solvency crisis and govern-
ments started to take explicit rescue measures directed towards financial institutions. In
September, Lehman Brothers collapsed which sent a shockwave to the entire financial sys-
tem, leading to an acute shortage in the funding market, sharp rise in risk aversion and
complete mistrust among financial players. A distinctive feature of the period up to mid-
September was an increased investor focus on signs that the US recession had spilled over
to other major economies, triggering a synchronized economic downturn (indeed, the euro
area officially entered recession in the last quarter of 2008 when its GDP fell 2.1%).
Some important observations can be drawn from Figures 3-4 and Tables 3 and 5. Table 3
shows that during the first stage, before the financial crisis, causality intensification mainly
took place from sovereigns to banks. We find evidence of at least one episode of causality
intensification in this direction in nine out of the eleven cases studied, the exceptions being
Greece and Italy. It is noticeable that these episodes are mainly concentrated in the second
semester of 2005 and in the first semester of 2007, coinciding with a period of economic
stagnation in EMU countries in the first case and with the beginning of a downturn in GDP
growth from 2007 in the euro area, which after peaking in the last quarter of 2006 (3.7%)
began to decrease until it reached negative values at the end of 2008.
In stage 2 not a single contagion episode is detected while in stage 3, only two episodes
of causality intensification, from banks to sovereigns though, are detected in Germany, con-
firming that the deterioration of Germany’s banking system after the US subprime crisis
resulted in a sovereign risk increase. These results are corroborated when analyzing causal-
ity intensification between SIBs and sovereigns risk before Lehman Collapse (see Table 5).
We do find episodes of contagion running from sovereigns to systematically important banks
in two peripheral countries (Ireland and Spain) and two central (Germany and France).
6.2. Crisis stages
Stage 4: The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 defined the beginning
of the fourth stage, which ended in 2009:Q1. This stage of the crisis was marked by con-
cerns about a deepening of the global recession and the repercussions of the Lehman Brothers
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bankruptcy, since the balance sheets of banks all around the globe indicated exposure to
their assets. Therefore, policy action was implemented on an international scale as gov-
ernments sought to support market functioning and to cushion the blow of rapid economic
contraction. In the European context, the ECB announced liquidity to support European
Banks (in September 2008 the Irish government already guaranteed all the deposits/debts
of the country’s banks), while the European Commission adopted the European Recovery
Plan and allowed governments to implement measures to bailout banks.
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, fears of losses in the European banks which
were more exposed to US assets triggered episodes of causality intensification from banks to
sovereigns, mostly in central EMU countries. Indeed, we detect episodes of causality inten-
sification in this direction in Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands (see Table 3)
and as it is shown in Table 5 in the case of Austria and Finland the causality intensification
episodes might be triggered by their SIBs. These results might indicate that central EMU
markets were hit more by the international financial crisis than peripheral markets. This
finding is in accordance with the results presented in Table 6 indicating governments’ com-
mitments to supporting the banking system during the period October 2008-May 2010 and
showing that in mid-2010 they were clearly higher in central than in peripheral countries
(with the exception of Ireland). In particular, the government commitment to bail out banks
in the three countries above mentioned was between 20% and 75% of their GDP.
[Table 6 about here.]
Stage 5: It started in 2009:Q2, when the first signs of recovery appeared and global
uncertainty receded (announcements by central banks concerning balance sheet expansions,
and the range and the amount of assets to be purchased, led to significant relief in the
financial markets) and ends in 2009:Q3 just before the newly elected Greek government
announced that the country’s budget deficit was much larger than previously reported,
marking the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Signs of recovery were noted
as well as an atmosphere of some relief in the financial markets.
The group of countries which intervened at the earliest stages of the crisis by taking
bulk of the losses associated with bailout (i.e. Austria, Germany and Ireland) or choose
to nationalize banks (e.g., Belgium) saw a sharp reduction in the direction of risk transfer
from banks to sovereign. However, Spain whose economy observed a serious slump (Spanish
GDP fell 4.0% and 2.6%, in 2009:Q3 and 2009:Q4 respectively), saw a sudden rise in risk
transfers from sovereign towards banks. There may also have been some pressure from
governments on banks within their jurisdiction to buy their domestic debt. Indeed, at the
end of 2011, the home share of all Spanish banks’ sovereign exposure was 81% (the highest in
the euro area) and they held the equivalent of 44% of Spanish GDP in the form of domestic
bonds. This may have broadened concerns about their exposure to bad assets and may
have fed speculation about their solvency. As a further step, it might be interesting to fully
analyze the econometric link between the timing and level of government guarantees and
the occurrences of events impacting the financial needs of the economy. Besides, episodes of
causality intensification from banks to sovereigns in this stage were detected in only three
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central countries. France and the Netherlands if we use the average banking risk indicator
for the whole country (Table 3) and Finland when using the risk indicator corresponding to
its SIBs (Table 5).
Stage 6: The sixth stage began in 2009:Q4 and ended in 2011:Q3. This period was
marked by concerns about European sovereign debt market’s stability due to fears that
Greece’s debt crisis would spread to EMU peripheral countries. Indeed, during this period
rescue packages were put in place in Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010) and Portu-
gal (April 2011). The sharp increase in sovereign spreads of euro-area countries with respect
to Germany after the explosion of the Greek crisis was due to a combination of deteriorating
macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals and to some form of financial contagion. Indeed,
a crisis in one country can lead to reassessment of objectively unchanged fundamentals in
other countries. This is what some authors (Goldstein (1998)) call ‘wake-up call’ contagion
since it leads market participants aware of existing problems or risks they failed to see before.
It is noticeable that during this period, in which concerns about European sovereign debt
crisis transmission were at their peak and rescue packages were put in place, Table 3 shows
that episodes of causality intensification from sovereigns to banks started rising gradually
in all peripheral and central countries. Episodes of causality intensification from banks
to sovereigns were identified in all peripheral and central countries (except for Belgium).
These findings suggest the following ideas: (1) In Portugal and Italy, causality intensification
from the sovereign to the banking sector can be easily understood, since the main source
of vulnerability in those countries was concentrated in the public sector itself. Moreover,
Portuguese and Italian banks held the equivalent of 23% and 21% of their countries’ GDP in
the form of domestic bonds which, as we stated above, might have fed speculation regarding
their solvency; (2) The sudden drop in investor confidence induced fears of contagion in all
euro area countries and led to ‘flight-to-safety’ investments, which increased the demand for
the German bund and also caused a sharp rise in yield spreads of EMU central countries.
This increase in risk in the sovereign sector may have been transmitted to their banking
sectors20; (3) Not only in Ireland (where banks’ debt-to-GDP was close to 450% at the
end of 2012), but also in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece the high leverage registered in
the banking sector (194%, 150%, 110% and 100% of their GDP respectively, at the end of
2012) may have increased tensions in their already vulnerable and distressed public sector.
Moreover, when looking at Table 5, we detect two episodes of risk transfer from SIBs to
sovereigns in Greece and Austria, jointly with one episode in France. It must be noticed
that the episodes detected in 2011:Q3 in Greece and France are also detected when analyzing
causality running from the average bank risk indicator for the whole country.
Stage 7: The seventh stage of the crisis, which began in 2011:Q4 when Mario Dragi
20The role of investors’ risk aversion is revealed by the reaction of yields on highly rated sovereign securities.
In fact, yields of bonds issued by countries with solid fiscal fundamentals, such as Austria, Finland and the
Netherlands, also rose vis-a-vis the German bund. These countries maintained their triple-A ratings and
therefore the surge in their yields cannot be explained by increased credit risk. Since the intensification
of the financial crisis in September 2008, flight-to-safety tendencies have increased demand for the bund,
affecting all euro area countries’ sovereign spreads, including those for Austria, Finland and the Netherlands
(see European Central Bank, 2014).
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replaced Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the European Central Bank and ended in
2012:Q2, was still a period of high turmoil in European markets. Italy was in the middle
of a political crisis and the main rating agencies lowered the ratings not only of peripheral
countries, but also of Austria and France. In this context of financial distress and huge
liquidity problems, the European Central Bank responded forcefully by implementing (along
with other central banks) nonstandard monetary policies, i.e., policies beyond setting the
refinancing rate. In particular, the ECB’s principal means of intervention were the so-called
long term refinancing operations (LTRO). In November 2011 and March 2012, the ECB
allotted to banks an amount close to 500 billion Euros for a three-year period. However,
in March 2012 the second rescue package to Greece was approved and in June 2012 Spain
requested financial assistance to recapitalizes its banking sector.
During the seventh stage, coinciding with the nonstandard monetary policies imple-
mented by the ECB (two LTRO) to support the banking system, episodes of causality
intensification from banks to sovereigns (see Table 3) were found mainly in peripheral coun-
tries (Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal). Recall that in spring 2011, the three program
countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) made up more than 50% of total liquidity provided
through both the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the LTRO windows - although
some episodes were also detected in this direction in Austria, France, Germany and the
Netherlands. These results are reinforced in the analysis presented in Table 5.
However, it is also noticeable that in Spain, a country that requested financial assistance
to recapitalizes its banking sector in June 2012, one episode of causality intensification from
the sovereign to the banking sector was identified just after the rescue (2012:Q3). This result
suggests that in the Spanish case, even though the country only requested assistance for its
financial sector, the sovereign risk was clearly transferred to the banking sector.
Stage 8: Finally, the last stage of the crisis began in 2012:Q3 after Mario Draghi’s
statement on July 26 that ‘within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to
preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough,’ which had a healing effect on markets,
and finished at the end of the sample period in 2013:Q2. It is important to remark that after
July’s statement, on September 6 the ECB introduced the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) program. The program had two key elements. First, under the OMT, the ECB could
purchase government bonds of a given country, focusing on maturities between 1 and 3 years,
and with no ex-ante quantitative limits. Second, a country had to apply for the OMT in
which case it would also have to undertake a set of fiscal adjustments. That is, the program
involved conditionality. The ECB action implied an important reduction of redenomination
risk. Therefore, as some authors have pointed out (see Angelini et al. (2014)), commitments
by the ECB or the government to never redenominate, such as the OMT, have proved to be
effective. Indeed, Angelini et al. (2014) present empirical evidence that suggest that OMT
announcements decreased bond yields in peripheral countries. In this context, despite the
healing effects of Mario Draghi’s words and OMT announcements on financial markets, some
episodes of causality intensification were still found from sovereigns to banks in Italy and
Finland (in the latter country, their SIBs were the main recipients of the risk, see Table 5)
and from banks to sovereigns (Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands). We should keep
in mind that, although turbulence in financial markets fell sharply, the economic recession
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entered its second dip during this period. Thus, as Shambaugh (2012) mentioned, not only
did the problems of weak banks and high sovereign debt reinforce each other, but were both
exacerbated by weak economic growth.
6.3. Pre-crisis vs crisis period: In comparison
From early 2005 till the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 77% of the total episodes of causal-
ity intensification detected were from sovereigns to banks, whereas after the last quarter of
2008, coinciding with the beginning of the financial crisis and the implementation of gov-
ernment measures to support financial institutions, the direction of causality intensification
underwent a change. In this second sub-period the majority of the episodes of causality in-
tensification (around 63% of the total) ran from banks to sovereigns: specifically, in the cases
of France, Greece, and Ireland (where episodes of causality intensification were detected only
in this direction), and Portugal and the Netherlands (where they accounted for more than
70% of the total episodes). Conversely, in Belgium and Finland causality intensification was
mainly identified from sovereigns to banks, whilst in Spain, Italy and Austria there were
similar numbers of episodes of causality intensification in both directions.
Germany represents an exception since we find two episodes of contagion from bank to
sovereigns in the first sub-period, at the end of stage 3 (2008:Q2 and 2008:Q3), while not
a single contagion episode is detected in any other stage or direction. In our opinion, the
immunity of German bunds to the weakness of German banking sector might be explained
by the specific form of its government interventions to bailout financial institutions or the
stability of German government revenues (see Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002)). In ad-
dition, it is important to keep in mind that the sudden drop in investor confidence that
followed the crisis led to ‘flight-to-safety’ investments, increasing the demand for the Ger-
man Bund in times of distress. These results are corroborated when analyzing causality
intensification between SIBs and sovereign risk in each of the eleven countries in the sample.
In the pre-crisis period (stages 1 to 3) all the detected episodes run from sovereigns to SIBs;
whilst in the crisis period (stages 4 to 8) 82% of the total detected episodes of causality
intensification run from SIBs to sovereigns.
7. Concluding remarks
Based on our selection of bank and sovereign risk indicators at country level in eleven
of the countries that have belonged to the EMU since its inception (only Luxembourg is
excluded from the analysis), we applied a dynamic approach to testing for sudden and
transitory increases in Granger-causality linkages to investigate the possible existence of
causality intensification. Our direct analysis of the data allowed us to detect, trace and
quantify the directional linkages. To contextualize the empirical results, we followed the
Bank for International Settlements (2009) and divide the entire time span (2005:Q1 to
2013:Q2) into eight stages.
In the first three stages, from early 2005 till the collapse of Lehman Brothers, more than
77% of the total episodes of causality intensification detected were from sovereigns to banks,
corresponding with a period of economic stagnation in EMU countries or with the beginning
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of a downturn in GDP growth in the euro area. After the last quarter of 2008, coinciding
with the beginning of the financial crisis and the implementation of government measures
to support financial institutions, the direction of the causality intensification underwent a
change. In this second sub-period (stages four to eight) the majority of the episodes (around
63% of the total) ran from banks to sovereigns, notable cases being France, Greece, Ireland
(only episodes of causality intensification in this direction were detected), Portugal and the
Netherlands (where they account for more than 70% of the episodes). These results reinforces
the idea that banks were the source of market turbulence, possibly reflecting the substantial
government measures adopted at that time to support the domestic banking sectors that in
turn adversely affected the fiscal position of sovereigns. Conversely, in Belgium and Finland
causality intensification was mainly from sovereigns to banks, indicating that banks suffered
from the deteriorating values of their sovereign bond holdings as well as higher funding costs.
Finally, for Spain, Italy and Austria, we detected similar numbers of episodes of causality
intensification in both directions, pointing to an adverse feedback loop between sovereigns
and banks with shocks propagating from one to each other. These results are validated
when analyzing causality intensification between SIBs and sovereign risk in each of the
eleven countries in the sample, although only 18% of the detected episodes of contagion
between banking and sovereign risk corresponds to SIBs. These findings might suggest that
most of the risk transfer episodes are not related with SIBs and the strong emphasis placed
on SIBs for detecting and monitoring systemic risk and financial system stability should be
carefully reassessed.
We do find empirical evidence supporting the direct two-way negative feedback between
the banking and sovereign CDS market of the Eurozone countries for the period of 2009-2011
in line with Acharya et al. (2014) and Alter and Beyer (2014). However our results differ from
those of Alter and Schu¨ler (2012) who using CDS spreads find that before the government
rescue interventions contagion spills over from the banking sector to the sovereign market,
whereas after the interventions sovereign CDS spreads largely determine the price of banks’
CDS series. In line with the results obtained by Dieckmann and Plank (2011), we also find
evidence for a private-to-public risk transfer in countries with government interventions.
Using different risk indicators and empirical methodology, we still find evidence supporting:
(i) Spillovers heightening during 2008 and more recently in 2011-12; and (ii) From 2008
contagion primarily went from banks to sovereigns but the direction reversed in 2011-12 in
the course of the sovereign debt crisis, as obtained in Gross and Kok (2013).
In view of the encouraging results of the present study, we are planning to extend the
research to explore the determinants of causality intensification based on the country specific
bailout strategies employed to address the stress in individual EMU countries (see Stolz and
Wedow (2010)). As the country specific fiscal support and banking regulation creates market
distortions, we can also explore the role of banking union in disentangling the risk of EMU
banks and their governments in influencing the risk patterns (Belke (2013), Belke and Gros
(2015) and Breuss et al. (2015)).
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Table 1: Description of variables
Balance sheet variables Source
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2025)
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short term funding Bankscope (Code 2030)
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2055)
Daily market based variables
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country where
the bank headquarter is based
Thomson Datastream
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by total
outstanding share in public
Thomson Datastream
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Table 2: List of banks (by country)
AT - UniCredit Bank Austria AG (AT0000995006)* FR - Boursorama (FR0000075228)
AT - Erste Group Bank AG (AT0000652011) FR - Cre´dit Agricole du Morbihan (FR0000045551)
AT - Raiffeisen Bank International AG (AT0000606306) FR - Cre´dit Agricole Brie Picardie (FR0010483768)
BE - Dexia (BE0003796134) FR - Socie´te´ Alsacienne de De´veloppement et d’Expansion
(FR0000124315)*
BE - KBC Groep NV (BE0003565737) GR - National Bank of Greece SA (GRS003003019)
DE - Landesbank Berlin Holding AG (DE0008023227)* GR - Piraeus Bank SA (GRS014003008)
DE - Hypothekenbank Frankfurt AG (DE0008076001)* GR - Eurobank Ergasias SA (GRS323003004)
DE - UniCredit Bank AG (DE0008022005)* GR - Alpha Bank AE (GRS015013006)
DE - Oldenburgische Landesbank (DE0008086000) GR - Marfin Investment Group (GRS314003005)
DE - Deutsche Postbank AG (DE0008001009) GR - Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA (GRS001003003)
DE - UmweltBank AG (DE0005570808) GR - General Bank of Greece SA (GRS002003010)
DE - Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (DE0008027707)* IE - Depfa Bank Plc (IE0072559994)*
DE - HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG (DE0008115106) IE - Irish Bank Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IE00B06H8J93)*
DE - Deutsche Bank AG (DE0005140008) IE - Permanent TSB Plc (IE0004678656)*
DE - Commerzbank AG (DE000CBK1001) IE - Bank of Ireland (IE0030606259)
DE - Wu¨stenrot & Wu¨rttembergische (DE0008051004) IE - Allied Irish Banks plc (IE0000197834)
DE - Comdirect Bank AG (DE0005428007) IT - UniCredit SpA (IT0004781412)
DE - Net-M Privatbank 1891 AG (DE0008013400)* IT - Intesa Sanpaolo (IT0000072618)
DE - Merkur-Bank KGaA (DE0008148206) IT - Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (IT0001334587)
DE - Quirin Bank AG (DE0005202303) IT - Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa (IT0003487029)
ES - Banco Santander SA (ES0113900J37) IT - Banco Popolare Societa` Cooperativa (IT0004231566)
ES - Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA
(ES0113211835)
IT - Mediobanca SpA (IT0000062957)
ES - Caixabank, S.A. (ES0140609019) IT - Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna (IT0000066123)
ES - Bankia, SA (ES0113307021) IT - Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL (IT0000064482)
ES - Banco de Sabadell SA (ES0113860A34) IT - Banca Carige SpA (IT0003211601)
ES - Banco Popular Espanol SA (ES0113790226) IT - Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Cooperativa per
Azioni (IT0000784196)
ES - Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo (ES0114400007) IT - Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM (IT0003121677)
ES - Bankinter SA (ES0113679I37) IT - Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop (IT0000064516)
ES - Renta 4 Banco, S.A. (ES0173358039) IT - Banca popolare dell’Etruria e del Lazio Soc. coop.
(IT0004919327)
FI - Pohjola Bank Plc (FI0009003222) IT - Credito Bergamasco (IT0000064359)
FI - Aktia Bank Plc (FI4000058870) IT - Banco di Sardegna SpA (IT0001005070)
FI - Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc
(FI0009001127)
IT - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA (IT0001041000)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Sud Rhoˆne Alpes (FR0000045346) IT - Banca Ifis SpA (IT0003188064)
FR - Paris Orle´ans SA (FR0000031684) IT - Banca Generali SpA (IT0001031084)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou
(FR0000045304)
IT - Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni
(IT0000074077)
FR - Credit Agricole Alpes Provence (FR0000044323) IT - Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA (IT0001007209)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Nord de France (FR0000185514) IT - Banca Profilo SpA (IT0001073045)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole d’Ile-de-France (FR0000045528) IT - Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA (IT0000088853)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire (FR0000045239) NL - SNS Reaal NV (NL0000390706)*
FR - Cre´dit Industriel et Commercial (FR0005025004) NL - RBS Holdings NV (NL0000301109)*
FR - Banque Tarneaud (FR0000065526)* NL - ING Groep NV (NL0000303600)
FR - Caisse re´gionale de Cre´dit Agricole Mutuel de
Normandie-Seine (FR0000044364)
NL - Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group (NL0009294552)
FR - Caisse Re´gionale de Cre´dit Agricole Mutuel du
Languedoc (FR0010461053)
NL - Van Lanschot NV (NL0000302636)
FR - Natixis (FR0000120685) NL - BinckBank NV (NL0000335578)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole de l’Ille-et-Vilaine (FR0000045213) PT - Montepio Holding SGPS SA (PTFNB0AM0005)*
FR - Cre´dit Agricole d’Aquitaine (FR0000044547)* PT - Banco Comercial Portugueˆs, SA (PTBCP0AM0007)
FR - Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale (FR0000130809) PT - Banco Espirito Santo SA (PTBES0AM0007)
FR - Cre´dit Agricole S.A. (FR0000045072) PT - Banco BPI SA (PTBPI0AM0004)
FR - BNP Paribas (FR0000131104) PT - BANIF, SA (PTBAF0AM0002)
Parenthesis contains the ISIN (International Securities Identification Number), an asterisk (*) mark represents companies
which got delisted during the study period. SIBs are indicated in italics (based on Bank of International Settlements
Global-SIBs as of November 2014). AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, DE: Germany, ES: Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GR:
Greece, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal.
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Table 3: Evolution of episodes of causality intensification
Stage Contagion Direction Peripheral Central
First stage Yes Sovereign to Ireland (2007:Q1)
(2005:Q1-2007:Q2) banks
No Banks to
sovereign
Second stage No Sovereign to
(2007:Q3-2008:Q1) banks
Yes Banks to Germany (2007:Q4)
sovereign Germany (2008:Q1)
Third stage No Sovereign to
(2008:Q2-2008:Q3) banks
Yes Banks to Germany (2008:Q2)
sovereign Finland (2008:Q3)
Fourth stage No Sovereign to
(2008:Q4 - 2009:Q1) banks
Yes Banks to Austria (2008:Q4)
sovereigns Finland (2008:Q4)
Netherlands (2008:Q4)
Fifth stage Yes Sovereign to Italy (2009:Q3)
(2009:Q2 - 2009:Q3) banks
No Banks to
sovereigns
Sixth stage Yes Sovereign to Italy (2010:Q3) Austria (2010:Q4)
(2009:Q4 - 2011:Q3) banks Austria (2011:Q1)
Yes Banks to Greece (2011:Q2)
sovereigns Italy (2011:Q2)
Italy (2011:Q3)
Seventh stage Yes Sovereign to Spain (2012:Q2)
(2011:Q4 - 2012:Q2) banks
Yes Banks to Greece (2011:Q4)
sovereigns Italy (2011:Q4)
Portugal (2012:Q1)
Eighth stage No Sovereign to
(2012:Q3 - 2013:Q2) banks
Yes Banks to France (2012:Q3)
sovereigns
Note: Only two of the detected episodes (the ones in bold face letters) correspond to SIBs.
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Table 4: List of SIBs in individual countries
Country Name
Austria Erste Group Bank AG
Belgium Dexia
Germany Deutsche Bank AG
Germany Commerzbank AG
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA
Spain Banco Santander SA
Finland Pohjola Bank plc - Pohjola Pankki Oyj
France Crdit Agricole S.A.
France Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale
France BNP Paribas
Greece National Bank of Greece SA
Ireland Allied Irish Banks plc
Italy UniCredit SpA
The Netherlands ING Groep NV
Portugal Banco Comercial Portugueˆs
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Table 5: Evolution of episodes of causality intensification between SIBs and sovereign risk.
Stage Contagion Direction Peripheral Central
First stage Yes Sovereign to Ireland (2007:Q2) Germany (2007:Q1)
(2005:Q1-2007:Q2) systemic bank
No Systemic bank - -
to sovereign
Second stage No Sovereign to Spain (2008:Q1) France (2007:Q3)
(2007:Q3-2008:Q1) systemic bank
No Systemic bank - -
to sovereign
Third stage No Sovereign to - -
(2008:Q2-2008:Q3) systemic bank
No Systemic bank - -
to sovereign
Fourth stage No Sovereign to - -
(2008:Q4 - 2009:Q1) systemic bank
No Systemic bank - Austria (2009:Q1)
to sovereign Finland (2009:Q1)
Fifth stage Yes Sovereign to -
(2009:Q2 - 2009:Q3) systemic bank
No Systemic bank - Finland (2009:Q2)
to sovereign
Sixth stage Yes Sovereign to
(2009:Q4 - 2011:Q3) systemic bank
No Systemic bank Greece (2011:Q2) Austria (2009:Q4)
to sovereign Greece (2011:Q3) Austria (2010:Q1)
France (2011:Q3)
Seven stage Yes Sovereign to
(2011:Q4 - 2012:Q2) systemic bank
No Systemic bank Greece (2011:Q4) France (2011:Q4)
to sovereign Greece (2012:Q1) France (2012:Q1)
Greece (2012:Q2)
Italy (2012:Q1)
Eight stage Yes Sovereign to Finland (2012:Q3)
(2012:Q3 - 2013:Q2) systemic bank Finland (2012:Q4)
Finland (2013:Q1)
No Systemic bank - -
to sovereign
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Figure 1: Country-wise banking sector aDtD and average CDS spreads
(a) Austria
1
2
3
4
5
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(b) Belgium
2
4
6
8
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(c) Germany
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
2
3
4
5
6
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
l lAverage banking CDS (in bps) Average Banking DtD
(d) Spain
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(e) Finland
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
(f) France
3
4
5
6
7
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(g) Greece
1
2
3
4
5
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(h) Ireland
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(i) Italy
2
3
4
5
6
7
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(j) The Netherlands
2
3
4
5
6
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
(k) Portugal
2
4
6
8
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
Dt
D
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
Av
e
ra
ge
 b
an
kin
g 
CD
S 
(in
 bp
s)
30
Figure 2: Country-wise banking sector aDtD and 10Y sovereign spreads over Germany
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Figure 3: Time-varying causality between sovereign and banking risk in EMU peripheral countries, 2005:Q1-
2013:Q2
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Note: We plot the differences between the FPE obtained when estimating sovereign spread series using only the information
contained in past sovereign spread series and the FPE obtained also using the information contained in past aDtD series
(aDtD → Spreads) and the differences between FPE obtained when estimating the aDtD series using only the information
contain in past aDtD series and the FPE obtained using also the information contained in past sovereign spread series
(Spreads → aDtD). We associate causality intensification from country banking risk towards sovereign risk with those
episodes where the difference aDtD → Spreads (left axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and causality
intensification from sovereign risk towards country banking risk with those episodes where the difference Spreads → aDtD
(right axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 3). The horizontal lines represents 95%
confidence band around the median FPE differences.
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Figure 4: Time-varying causality between sovereign and banking risk in EMU core countries, 2005:Q1-
2013:Q2
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(c) The Netherlands
2006 2008 2010 2012
−
0.
01
5
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
−
0.
01
5
−
0.
01
0
−
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
6NL
Banks −> Sovereign
Sovereign −> Banks
Pe
rio
d−
1
Pe
rio
d−
2
Pe
rio
d−
3
Pe
rio
d−
4
Pe
rio
d−
5
Pe
rio
d−
6
Pe
rio
d−
7
Pe
rio
d−
8
(d) Austria
2006 2008 2010 2012
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
−
0.
2
−
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
−
1.
5
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
AT
Banks −> Sovereign
Sovereign −> Banks
Pe
rio
d−
1
Pe
rio
d−
2
Pe
rio
d−
3
Pe
rio
d−
4
Pe
rio
d−
5
Pe
rio
d−
6
Pe
rio
d−
7
Pe
rio
d−
8
(e) Finland
2006 2008 2010 2012
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
−
0.
02
−
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
−
20
−
10
0
10
20
FI
Banks −> Sovereign
Sovereign −> Banks
Pe
rio
d−
1
Pe
rio
d−
2
Pe
rio
d−
3
Pe
rio
d−
4
Pe
rio
d−
5
Pe
rio
d−
6
Pe
rio
d−
7
Pe
rio
d−
8
(f) Germany
2006 2008 2010 2012
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
DE
Banks −> Sovereign
Sovereign −> Banks
Pe
rio
d−
1
Pe
rio
d−
2
Pe
rio
d−
3
Pe
rio
d−
4
Pe
rio
d−
5
Pe
rio
d−
6
Pe
rio
d−
7
Pe
rio
d−
8
Note: We plot the differences between the FPE obtained when estimating sovereign spread series using only the information
contained in past sovereign spread series and the FPE obtained also using the information contained in past aDtD series
(aDtD → Spreads) and the differences between FPE obtained when estimating the aDtD series using only the information
contain in past aDtD series and the FPE obtained using also the information contained in past sovereign spread series
(Spreads → aDtD). We associate causality intensification from country banking risk towards sovereign risk with those
episodes where the difference aDtD → Spreads (left axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and causality
intensification from sovereign risk towards country banking risk with those episodes where the difference Spreads → aDtD
(right axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (see Table 3). The horizontal lines represents 95%
confidence band around the median FPE differences.
33
Figure 5: Country wise major crisis events
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Figure 6: Major policy actions at EU level
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